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JERRY PHILLIPS' PRODUCTLINE CONTINUITY AND
SUCCESSOR CORPORA TION LIABILITY: WHERE ARE
WE TWENTY YEARS LATER?
GEORGE

W. KUNEY*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1983 the late Professor Jerry J. Phillips of the University of Tennessee
College of Law published his article ProductLine Continuity andSuccessor
CorporationLiabilityin the New York UniversityLaw Review.' In that piece,
Professor Phillips advocated an expanded version of the de facto merger
successor liability doctrine in product liability suits. In doing so, he argued
that, because several ofthe criteria for determining whether a sale of corporate
assets constitutes a de facto merger are irrelevant to the policies underlying
product liability law, we should adopt a product line theory that holds
successors liable for the product defects of their predecessors when they have
purchased a seller's business.2 In the process, he encouraged expansion and
consolidation of the mere continuation, continuity of enterprise, and product
line theories advanced in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,3 Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co. ,' and Ray v. Alad Corp.,' respectively.
Professor Phillips reasoned that a requirement that the predecessor
dissolve in order to activate the de facto merger or product line theories of
successor liability is contrary to the goals the doctrines should accomplish.6
He advocated collapsing the product line and de facto merger doctrines into
a single doctrine-"product line continuity"-featuring a multiplicity of
factors, no one of which would be dispositive.' From his perspective, the
touchstone of successor liability is "whether the purchaser has paid for
intangible items having what might be described as ongoing business value."'
If the potential successor purchases "this value, it buys product line continuity
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law. Professor
Kuney consults nationally regarding successor liability and other business and insolvency
matters for asset sellers, purchasers, creditors, and future claimants. The author thanks Thomas
Galligan, Carol Parker, and Donna Looper for their comments on earlier drafts of this piece and
related articles and John Gerth and Edward Meade for their research assistance.
1. Jerry J. Phillips, ProductLine Continuity and Successor CorporationLiability, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 906 (1983).
2. Id. at 906, 929.
3. 501 F.2d 1145, 1152-53 (1st Cir. 1974).
4. 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 1976).
5. 560P.2d3, 11 (Cal. 1977).
6. Phillips, supranote 1, at 915.
7. Id. at 920-21.
8. Id. at921.
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[liability]; if it does not, then it buys only assets."9 In other words, the
successor takes the bad with the good. Thus, the purchaser can determine
whether it will buy the business and, if so, whether it will discount the
purchase price and attempt to obtain insurance or other sources of funding or
support to cover the potential liability of future successor products liability
claims.'
Professor Phillips' arguments remain as sound today as they were in 1983.
The purchasing corporation has control over the form of the transaction as
well as the opportunity in due diligence to ferret out evidence of potential
exposure to liability and to adjust its price and insurance coverage to
compensate." The risk of future claims is not unlike other risks-it is
susceptible to analysis, forecast, and allocation by contract. 2
Be that as it may, the corporate-supremacy-over-tort-policy camp appears
in many jurisdictions to have beaten back the product line or continuity of
enterprise theory on three fronts. On the first front, in the state courts, the
policies that underlie product line decisions like Cyr, Turner, and Ray have
been treated as ironclad required elements rather than policy considerations
or non-dispositive factors.1' On the second front, in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: ProductsLiability,4 the "restaters" appear to have overemphasized
or "overcounted" the jurisdictions that have rejected more expansive
successor liability doctrines.' 5 Thus, the Restatement (Third) provides
continued cover and support for the first front in the campaign against
successor liability. Finally, on the third front, in what may appear to be an
unlikely forum to find protections for potential successors, the bankruptcy
courts (and the merger and acquisitions professionals that have come to
inhabit them) 6 have developed a sale free and clear of claims and interests
process that insulates, or at least appears to insulate, from successor liability

9.
10.

Id.
See id. at 925; see generally GARY M. LAWRENCE, DUE DILIGENCE IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS §§ 14.01 et seq. (2003) (discussing due diligence with respect to insurance and
liability coverage).
11. See LAWRENCE, supranote 10, §§ 1.01-.03 (identifying one goal of due diligence as
transaction evaluation and determination of fair price).
12. See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 57 (Alaska 2001)
(discussing use of insurance and adjustment of purchase price to allocate risk of successor
liability claims); see generally CHARLES M. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW
SCHOOL DOESN'T TEACH YOU § 2.2.3 (2002) (discussing use of representations to allocate risk
of veracity of certain facts).
13. See infra Part V.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (1997).
15. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning SuccessorLiability,1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 845, 85258.
16. See generally George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
19, 33 n.66 (2004) (noting use of bankruptcy proceedings as venues for merger and acquisition
activities).
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those who purchase business assets as a going concern from a bankruptcy
estate.' 7 The limits of this bankruptcy sale free and clear technique are not
entirely clear, and the question of barring future claims that were unknowable
at the time of the sale presents no small problem."
It is not fair or accurate, however, to say that the expansion of tort
recovery to include successor liability based upon a broad product line or
continuity of enterprise theory is all but dead. Its rise in the late 1970s and
early 1980s has slowed or remained static in a number of jurisdictions to
reflect the interests of corporate law.' 9 A substantial minority ofjurisdictions,
however, have not followed this trend.20 A number of well-reasoned opinions
reject corporate law's ascendency over tort's strict liability principles.2' The
rationale behind these decisions is not, however, what Professor Phillips had
in mind. Rather than a notion of enterprise or "take the good with the bad"
liability, the decisions that support continuity of enterprise or product line
liability appear to do so on the basis of spreading risk to afford plaintiffs a
remedy that they otherwise would not have.2 2
It is probably no accident that the campaign to identify a shift away from
tort liability has occurred as the mass of the United States population known
as the Baby Boom generation has aged, identifying less with those who are
likely to be injured by capital and more with capital itself. Thus, the
perceived enlightened self-interest ofthis demographic dictates that limitation
of corporate liability policy should be on the rise and that expanded, no-fault
tort liability, founded upon doctrines like risk-shifting and the low cost
insurer, should be in the decline.
The balance of this piece describes the fate of the Cyr, Turner, and Ray
product line and continuity of enterprise theories in their home jurisdictions2 3
as well as the reception these perceived expansions of successor liability

17. See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 36309 and
Undermining the Chapter 11 Process,76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002) (collecting cases and
discussing expansive interpretation of the word "interest" in section 363(f) to include "claims"
and thus allowing preplan bankruptcy sales to insulate purchasers from unsecured claims
including tort claims); see also Jo Ann J. Brighton, How Free is "Freeand Clear"?,21 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 1, 41-43 (2002).
18. Brighton, supranote 17, at 41-43.
19. Cupp, supra note 15, at 850.
20. Id. at 851, 857 & n.73.
21. David W. Pollack, Successor Liability in Asset Acquisitions, in ACQUIRING OR
SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 255, 274 (David W. Pollak & John F. Seegal eds.,
2003) (expressing optimism in view of the fact that continuity of enterprise and product line
theories have recently received favorable treatment in some courts).
22. See, e.g., Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49,55-58 (Alaska 2001).
23. See infra Parts II-IV. Cyr was a First Circuit Court of Appeals decision based upon
New Hampshire law. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1150 (1st Cir. 1974). Thus, New
Hampshire is treated as its "home" jurisdiction. Turner is a Michigan decision and Ray is a
California decision.
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received in other jurisdictions to show what has happened in the intervening
twenty-odd years since publication of Professor Phillips' article and, perhaps
more importantly, what has not.24 Determining where to draw the line to
allow for successor liability and whether corporate principles of separate
identity and limitation of liability should predominate over tort principles of
risk-spreading and the need to protect consumers and workers from dangerous
products is essentially a result-oriented decision informed by one's political
and economic views. The same applies to whether bankruptcy sales can or
should be free and clear of existing and future tort claims.2 5 The answer
depends upon which side of the debate one stands.
This makes it, ideally, a decision for state and federal legislatures rather
than the courts; however, legislatures, by and large, have not acted to resolve
the matter. 26 This failure to act leaves it to the courts to address the applicable
policy arguments while attempting to do substantial justice and balance the
rights of involuntary creditors (tort victims) against capital's desire for
certainty, limited liability, and the ability to efficiently allocate risk.2 ' There
is no easy, universal, principled solution to be found in the advocacy system,
but presently that may be all that we have.
II. TURNER V. BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CO.
In 1976 the Michigan Supreme Court expanded the four traditional
categories of successor liability and in so doing, adopted a "continuity of
enterprise" theory of successor liability.28 The court stated

24. See infra Part V.
25. See Kuney, supra note 17, at 268 n.125.
26. The Supreme Court of Alaska addressed whether the matter should be left to the
legislature by stating:
Some commentators, including the Restatement authors, reason that legislatures are better
situated than courts to define the parameters of successor liability. But we think this is an
appropriate subject for judicial decision because it is directly related to products liability
law, a doctrinal road long traveled by courts. For example, the four traditional exceptions
were created by the courts. There is also some suggestion that legislation in other states
has failed to address these problems. We see no reason to await legislation before
addressing this issue.
Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 58. In 2002 the Attorney General of Alaska recommended the veto
of a legislative attempt to reject the continuity of enterprise doctrine of successor liability and
reverse the Savage Arms decision of the Alaska Supreme Court. Op. Alaska Att'y Gen. (June
11, 2002), 2002 Alas. AG LEXIS 20, at * 1-2. But see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.1OB
(Vernon 2003) (rejecting successor liability in reaction to Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v.
Gerhardt,553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), which had adopted the de facto merger
doctrine).
27. Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 55-58.
28. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 1976).
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the rule that in the sale of corporate assets for cash, the first, third and fourth
criteria set forth in the Shannon quotation [developed] from McKee shall be
guidelines to establish whether there is continuity between the transferee and
the transferor corporations. If there is such continuity, then the transferee
must accept the liability with the benefits.29
The first, third, and fourth criteria cited from Shannon/McKee are three of the
four traditional elements of the de facto merger exception:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that
there is a continuity ofmanagement, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates,
and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller corporation.3 °
In its analysis of the case before it, the Turner court also stated:
Because this is a products liability case, however, there is a second aspect of
continuity which must also be considered. Where the successor corporation
represents itself either affirmatively or, by omitting to do otherwise, as in
effect a continuation of the original manufacturing enterprise, a strong
indication of continuity is established.3
Thus, the plaintiff in Turner was able to prove a prima facie case of
"continuation of corporate responsibility for products liability" by showing:
(1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation,
including, apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business
operations, and even the [seller's] name.
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated,
and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received from the
buying corporation.
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of
the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of the normal business
operations of the seller corporation.
29. Id. at 883 (citing Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D.
Mich. 1974); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1970)).

30. Id. at 879 (quoting Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801).
31. Id. at 882.
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(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective
continuation of the seller corporation. 2
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address the limits of the continuity
of enterprise exception or whether the legal standard was comprised of a set
of required elements or non-dispositive factors, not all of which would be
required in order for liability to attach, until 1999 in Foster v. ConeBlanchard Machine Co.3 In the interim, the court cited Turner in three
decisions, none of which clarified the key Turner holding.3 4 One appellate
court decision between Turnerand Fosterconcluded that satisfying the fourth
consideration in Turner (the purchasing corporation's holding itself out as a
continuation of the selling corporation) was not sufficient for a finding of
successor liability where the first three considerations were not met.35
In Foster,a plaintiff injured while operating a feed screw machine sued
the corporate successor after receiving a $500,000 settlement from the
predecessor corporation. 36 The court held that "because [the] predecessor was
available for recourse as witnessed by [the] plaintiff's negotiated settlement
with the predecessor for $500,000, the continuity of enterprise theory of
successor liability [was] inapplicable. '37 Thus, the Fostercourt resolved two
issues left open in Turner. First, the Michigan appellate decisions prior to
Fosterhad cited Turner for the proposition that the continuity of enterprise
test was comprised of four factors, following the four factors enumerated in
the Turner court's holding rather than the three factors listed in its rule.38 The

32. Id. at 883-84.
33. 597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999).
34. Jeffrey v. Rapid Am. Corp., 529 N.W.2d 644,656 (Mich. 1995) (citing Turner for the
proposition that corporate law principles should not be rigidly applied in products liability
cases); Stevens v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 446 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Mich. 1989) (citing Turner
as a case in which the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of successor liability in
the context of a products liability suit); Langley v. Harris Corp., 321 N.W.2d 662, 664-66
(Mich. 1982) (citing Turner for the proposition "that an acquiring corporation may be held
liable for products liability claims arising from activities of its predecessor corporation" under
a continuity of enterprise theory, but then holding that the Turner rationale will not allow a
corporation to seek indemnity from the plaintiff's employer in a products liability suit).
35. Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614,617, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that in a case in which a successor corporation had purchased only 8% of the assets
of another corporation in a bankruptcy sale and did not meet the first three criteria of Turner but
held itself out as a continuation of the liquidating corporation, the mere continuation test was
not satisfied). The court noted that to impose successor liability in such circumstances would
effectively be an adoption of the broader "product line" exception. Id. at 620.
36. Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 508.
37. Id.
38. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pimey Bowes Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 205164,
1999 WL 33451719, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1999); Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. SorensenGross Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 221,225-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Pelc, 314 N.W.2d at 618;
Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Powers v. Baker-
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Foster court clarified that, in fact, the Turner rule is comprised of three
required elements:
Turner held that a prima facie case of continuity of enterprise exists where
the plaintiff establishes the following facts: (1) there is continuation of the
seller corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel,
physical location, assets, and general business operations of the predecessor
corporation; (2) the predecessor corporation ceases its ordinary business
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically
possible; and (3) the purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
continuation ofnormal business operations ofthe selling corporation. Turner
identified as an additional principle relevant to determining successor
liability, whether the purchasing corporation holds itself out to the world as
the effective continuation of the seller corporation.39
In a footnote, the court recognized the relationship between the three
necessary elements for continuity of enterprise and the fourth "separate and
relevant inquiry":40
This principle has been called the fourth guideline of the Turner continuity
of enterprise analysis. However, we note that a truer reading of Turner
suggests that the first three guidelines were intended to complete the
continuity [of] enterprise inquiry where there is a sale of corporate assets.
Turner went on to identify as a separate and relevant inquiry whether a
purchasing corporation holds itself out as the effective continuation of the
seller.41
Thus, in view of Foster, a plaintiff alleging successor liability under the
continuity of enterprise exception has the burden of producing evidence
sufficient to satisfy only the three articulated elements.42
Second, the Fostercourt held that the "'continuity of enterprise' doctrine
applies only when the transferor is no longer viable and capable of being
sued."4 3 The court interpreted the underlying rationale of Turner as seeking
"to provide a source of recovery for injured plaintiffs."'
In his dissent,
Justice Brickley disagreed with the majority as to the underlying rationale of
Turner, arguing that the Turner court expanded liability based on the
successor corporation's enjoyment of "certain continuing benefits":

Perkins, Inc., 285 N.W.2d 402, 404-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
39. Foster,597 N.W.2d at 510.
40. IdatlOn.6.
41. Id.
42. See Meram v. Clark Ref. & Mktg., Inc., No. 221342, 2001 WL 1606883, at *2 n.4
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001).
43. Foster,597 N.W.2d at 511.
44. Id.
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[T]he test in Turner is designed to determine whether the company (or
"enterprise") involved in the lawsuit is essentially the same company that was
allegedly negligent in designing or manufacturing the offending product.
We explained that the policy basis of this "continuity of the enterprise"
requirement "'is that the enterprise, the going concern, ought to bear the
liability for the damages done by its defective products."' We also reasoned
that such an enterprise enjoys certain continuing benefits, such as goodwill
and expertise, and therefore must also accept continuing responsibility for the
costs that the enterprise has imposed on society through its negligence.45
Therefore, the Foster majority relies upon the policy of providing the
plaintiff with a recovery as the fundamental basis for extending successor
liability under Turner,whereas the minority, adopting Professor Phillips' "bad
with good" approach, would impose successor liability when the successor
enjoys the continuing benefits of the enterprise.
The dissent notwithstanding, the Foster decision appears to return
Michigan law to its state immediately after Turner was decided, recognizing
continuity of enterprise as a doctrine of successor liability having three
requisite elements. To the extent that intervening decisions had narrowed
Turnerby adding a fourth factor (namely, whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller
corporation), that revision of the doctrine appears to have been reversed.
UI. RAY V.ALAD CORP.: STATIC AFTER Two DECADES
A. The Genesis of the "ProductLine " Exception: Ray v. Alad Corp.
It is a mistake to read too much into a name. The "product line" exception
to the general rule of no successor liability originated in California with Ray
v. Alad Corp.46 In that case, the Supreme Court of California imposed liability
on the successor for an injury sustained by a plaintiff when he fell off of a
ladder manufactured by the predecessor.4 7 The court concluded that none of
the traditional successor liability doctrines applied48 and that successor
liability was appropriate in the particular circumstances, stating:
We therefore conclude that a party which acquires a manufacturing business
and continues the output of its line of products under the circumstances here
presentedassumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product

45. Id.at 513-14 (Brickley, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Turner v.
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Mich. 1976)).
46. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
47. Id. at 4-5.
48. Id. at 7-8.
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line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the

business was acquired.49

The term "product line" does not refer to the mere purchase of one or many
of the predecessor's product lines. Rather, it refers to the purchase of the
predecessor's manufacturing business and continued production of the
predecessor'sproduct line. As such, it resembles what in other jurisdictions
is termed "continuity of enterprise" successor liability.5 °
The policy justifications articulated by the Ray court for imposing
successor products liability were an important component of its analysis:
Justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufacturer
under the circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the virtual destruction
of the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the
successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the successor's ability to assume
the original manufacturer's risk-spreading [role], and (3) the fairness of
requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that
was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will
being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business. 5
California appellate courts, as well as other courts applying the product line
test, refer to these three policyjustifications set forth in Ray in different ways;
but generally, they all treat these justifications as elements-that is, as
requirements.52 In Henkel Corp. v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co., 53 the
California Supreme Court recently referred to the policy justifications of Ray
as "conditions. 54
1. The First Condition of Ray: Destruction of Plaintiff's Remedies
Under the first, and most significant, condition of Ray, the successor's
acquisition of the business must cause the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's
remedies against the predecessor in order for successor liability to be
imposed.5 5 In Ray, as part of the sales transaction, the predecessor agreed "to

49. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152 (1st Cir. 1974); Turner, 244
N.W.2d at 879, 883.
51. Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-9.
52. See, e.g., Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 876 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (referring to the "three criteria" ofRay); see also Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc.,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 672-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to the Ray "considerations");
Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to
Ray's "three-prong test").
53. 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003).
54. Id. at 73.
55. Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.
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dissolve its corporate existence as soon as practical 5 6 and actually did
dissolve within two months after the sale "in accordance with the purchase
agreement. 5 7 The court held that the transaction "depriv[ed the] plaintiff of
redress against the [predecessor],"" contrasting the facts of the case before it
with those in Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., in which the predecessor
remained
"a going concern for a substantial period following [the plaintiff's]
'6°
injury.

In applying this first Ray condition, courts consistently have required
some level of causation-that is, the acquisition of the business must cause or
substantially contribute to the destruction of the plaintiff s remedies. 6, Thus,
the Supreme Court of California concluded in Henkel that the first condition
of Ray was not met because "there [were] no grounds for claiming that [the
predecessor] was destroyed by the . . . sale of its . . . business to [the
successor] ."62

In instances in which a successor corporation exercised complete control
over the predecessor and "could have at any time forced [the predecessor] into
bankruptcy," however, the causation element has been found to be satisfied,
despite the fact that the successor did not expressly require the dissolution of
the predecessor.63 The court in Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co.6 held
that the successor's financial and managerial control over the predecessor "at
least substantially contributed to the absence of [the predecessor] from the
recovery pool of product liability plaintiffs. 65
56. Id. at6.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 10.
59. 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
60. Ray, 560 P.2d at 10 n.6.
61. See, e.g., Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 876-77 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that the successor could not be held liable because the causation or substantial
contribution requirement was not met when the successor bought the assets from the
predecessor, an asbestos manufacturer; the predecessor remained in business for fifteen months
after the sale; and the successor played no role in the predecessor's decision to dissolve);
Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("'The
traditional corporate rule of nonliability is... counterbalanced by the policies of strict liability
[only] when acquisition by the successor, and not some [other] event or act, virtually destroys
the ability of the plaintiff to seek redress from the manufacturer of the defective product."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 792 (Wash.
1984))); Kaminski v. W. MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(imposing successor liability when the successor's financial and managerial control over the
predecessor "at least substantially contributed" to the destruction of the plaintiff's remedies).
62. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 74 (Cal. 2003) (citing
Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871).
63. Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 903; see also Phillips v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr.
311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (relying on the Kaminski rationale for the first condition of Ray).
64. 220 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
65. Id. at 903; see also Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984)
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The causation requirement in the first condition ofRay has been analyzed
several times in the context of bankruptcy sales. In the bankruptcy context,
a successor who merely purchases assets at a bankruptcy sale is not
considered the cause of a plaintiffs lack of remedy against the predecessor.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated this general principle in
Nelson v. Tiffany Industries, Inc.66 In Nelson, the predecessor manufactured
grain augers.67 Four years after manufacturing the auger in question, the
predecessor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11, and the successor
purchased all of the predecessor's assets in a bankruptcy court approved
sale.68 The court declined to impose successor liability, stating:
It is our view that the California Supreme Court's decision in Ray does not
apply where there is a good faith dissolution in bankruptcy which is not
intended to avoid future tort claims against the predecessor. Under such
circumstances, the successor corporation has not contributed to or caused the
destruction of the plaintiff's remedies.69
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court because the record
did not specify whether the district court "considered the evidence offered by
the plaintiff for the purpose of showing that [the predecessor] filed its petition
pursuant to a collusive agreement with [the successor]."7" The appellate court
went on to note, however, that "[i]f the evidence shows that [the successor]
induced [the predecessor] to file for bankruptcy to avoid future tort liability,
the Ray exception to the general rule would be applicable."'"
In Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc.,7 the California Court of
Appeal addressed successor products liability for a bankrupt predecessor's
defective antenna." The court noted that "the sole distinction between [Ray]
and the present case is that '[the successor] purchased [the predecessor]74
through the intermediary of the bankruptcy courts[] rather than directly."'
The court noted that Kaminski found successor liability in a case in which a
successor "substantially contributed" to the demise of the predecessor, but
stated, "Nevertheless, some causal connection between the succession and the

(concluding that Ray "requir[es] that the asset sale contribute to the destruction of the plaintiffs'
remedies"); Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
("[T]o be liable, [the successor] must have 'played some role in curtailing or destroying the
[plaintiff's] remedies."' (quoting Kaminski, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 895)).
66. 778 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1985).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 538.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
73. Id. at 670.
74. Id. at 673 (third alteration in original).
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destruction of the plaintiff's remedy must be shown. ' 75 The court proceeded
to discuss the balance between products liability policy and corporate needs
of limiting risk exposure, concluding:
"It is the element of causation ...
that tips the balance in favor of imposing
successor liability. The traditional corporate rule of nonliability is only
counterbalanced by the policies of strict liability when acquisition by the
successor, and not some [other] event or act, virtually destroys the ability of76
the plaintiffto seek redress from the manufacturer ofthe defective product. ,
The Stewart court, finding "no showing of causation ... in the voluntary
bankruptcy of [the predecessor], nor any showing it was a mere subterfuge to
avoid 77
the holding of [Ray]," held that the product line exception did not
apply.
Thus, both California and Ninth Circuit precedent demonstrate a
continued causation requirement in applying the first condition of Ray.
Though Kaminski ostensibly relaxed the causation requirement, some level of
causation, at least the predecessor's "substantial contribution" to the
destruction of the plaintiff's remedies, is required. As stated above, this first
condition is the most significant in the Ray v. Alad Corp. analysis. My
research has not disclosed a single case in which successor liability was
denied after a finding by the court that the successor had caused or
substantially contributed to the destruction of the plaintiff s remedies.
2. The Second Condition of Ray: Successor's Ability to Spread the Risk
Even if the first condition of Ray fails, courts often still examine the
second condition--"the successor's ability to assume the original
manufacturer's risk-spreading [role]." 78 The court in Ray concluded that this
condition was met because both physical assets as well as "know-how," in the
form of manufacturing designs, continuing personnel, and consulting services
from the predecessor's general manager, gave the successor "virtually the
same capacity as [the predecessor] to estimate the risks of claims for injuries
from defects in previously manufactured ladders for purposes of obtaining
insurance coverage or planning self-insurance."79 In determining whether the
successor has the requisite "ability to assume the [predecessor's] riskspreading [role]," 0 courts often first compare and contrast the facts of the case
before them with those in Ray."' In addition, however, subsequent cases have
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.at 675.
Id.(quoting Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 792 (Wash. 1984)).
Id.at 676.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).
Id.at 10.
Id.at 9.
See, e.g., Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984); Chaknova
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relied upon or cited Rawlings v. D.M Oliver, Inc.8 2 while injecting into the
risk-spreading analysis what has come to be recognized as a "fairness" factor,
blurring the separate nature of the second and third conditions of Ray.83
3. The Third Condition of Ray: Fairness
The court in Ray v. Alad Corp. stated that the third justification for
imposing liability on the successor "rests upon.., the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden
necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will being enjoyed
by the successor in the continued operation of the business."" The court
concluded:
[T]he imposition upon [the successor] of liability for injuries from [the
predecessor's] defective products is fair and equitable in view of [the
successor's] acquisition of [the predecessor's] trade name, good will, and
customer lists[;] its continuing to produce the same line of ladders[;] and its
holding itself out to potential customers as the same enterprise."

In other words, the acquisition of goodwill may carry attendant burdens, such
as liability for product defects. Like the dissent in Fosterv. Cone-Blanchard
Machine Co., this consideration from the original Ray doctrine seems to fit
well with Professor Phillips' "bad with good" rationale. But the focus of the
fairness analysis in the third condition of Ray appears to have since shifted.

v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Rosales v. ThermexThermatron, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 865-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Lundell v. Sidney Mach.
Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159
Cal. Rptr. 119, 123-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
82. 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
83. See Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877 (noting in its discussion of the second riskspreading prong that "the Rawlings court rested its imposition of liability on '[flundamental
fairness... through a balancing of the rights of the injured party against the rights of those
engaged in business, including the latter'sreasonable commercial expectations"' (emphasis
added in Chaknova)(quoting Rawlings, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124)); see also Lundell, 236 Cal. Rptr.
at 76. Citing Rawlings, the Lundell court stated:
It is one thing to impose risk-spreading analysis and liability upon a major corporation
with valuable assets, many product lines, high volume, and great resources available to pay
for insurance. It is quite another to impose risk-spreading analysis and a level of liability
on a tiny sole proprietorship, which liability may exceed the proprietorship's net assets.
Id.at 76.
84. Ray, 560 P.2d at 9.
85. Id.at 10-11 (noting also that the successor's "deliberate albeit legitimate exploitation
of [the predecessor's] established reputation as a going concern manufacturing a specific
product line gave [the successor] a substantial benefit which its predecessor could not have
enjoyed without the burden of potential liability for injuries from previously manufactured
units").
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Courts now are apt to examine whether the imposition of liability upon the
successor would be "fair" in general or fair to the successor.86 Thus, the third
prong, which began as a justification for imposing successor liability, is now
often used as an additional reason for not imposing liability. 7
B. ProductLine SuccessorLiability Is Limited to Strict Liability
Plaintiffs in several instances have attempted to extend the product line
exception in Ray beyond strict products liability to successor liability for acts
of negligence.88 In these cases, however, California appellate courts have
limited the product line exception to strict tort liability. Though courts have
noted the practical reality that plaintiffs harmed by corporate negligence are
not significantly different than plaintiffs harmed by defective products, those
courts have noted that Ray was limited to the circumstances of that case, and
the applicable circumstances require strict tort liability.89
C. Ray v. Alad Corp. and ProductLine Successor Liability: A FinalNote
If one were looking for the points where the product line successor
liability "door" stood open the widest in California, the starting point would
be Rawlings v. D.M Oliver,Inc.9" The Rawlings court noted that Ray "should
not be construed so narrowly as to create an exclusive exception to the general
rule for successor liability permitting a similar result only in [a Ray] clone."'"
The Rawlings court had no problem applying strict liability in the case of a
custom-made kelp dryer and found no substantive difference in whether a
predecessor was a corporation or a sole proprietorship.92 While in Ray the
plaintiff was injured six months after the predecessor was dissolved and in
Rawlings the injury from the kelp dryer occurred three months before the
successor purchased the business, the court found this irrelevant in applying
Ray.93 However, the court in Lundell v. Sidney Machine Tool Co.94 declined
to impose successor liability,9 5 noting that the successor was a "tiny sole

86. See Chaknova, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878.
87. See, e.g., Klinev. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); Chaknova,
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878; Lundell, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
88. See, e.g., Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Monarch Bay 11 v. Prof'l Serv. Indus., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778,778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Maloney
v. Am. Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
89. See Monarch Bay II, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780.
90. 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
91. Id. at 124.
92. Id. at 120, 124.
93. Id. at 123 ("The timeliness of [the plaintiff's] action is governed solely by the
applicable statute of limitations and not whether she was injured before or after the sale.").
94. 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
95. Id. at 76-77.
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proprietorship"96 and that the case was "factually distinguishable from Ray."97
Moreover, subsequent cases also have cited Rawlings when adding a "fairness
to the successor" factor to the risk-spreading analysis set out in Ray.9"
As noted above, the causation requirement was relaxed in Kaminski and
shifted from a strict requirement to a "substantial contribution" requirement.99
This articulation ofthe required causation is repeated in Chaknova and echoed
again in Stewart. However, the Stewart court noted that
"this causation requirement is not a strict one, and sufficient causation will be
found as long as the successor played some role in curtailing or destroying
plaintiff's remedies ....Thus, when a successor [as in Kaminski] forces a
corporation to dissolve by exercising its financial power as a creditor and its
right to dictate policy to the directors of the corporation, sufficient causation
exists."100

"Nevertheless," the court continued, "some causal connection between the
succession and the destruction of the plaintiffs remedy must be shown."' 0 '
Thus, Kaminski's relaxation of the causation requirement generally has been
limited to its facts.
An example of the product line door closing a bit from Rawlings and
Kaminski may be found in Monarch Bay 11 v. ProfessionalService Industries,
Inc.,° inwhich the court addressed whether the product line exception should
be extended to cases involving corporate negligence.'13 After refusing to
extend the product line test, the court stated:
The trend in other jurisdictions appears to be away from expansion of
successor liability. Although the product line exception was adopted by a
number of courts following the Ray opinion, "recent cases from a variety of
states have rejected the product line exception in favor of retaining the
traditional rule on non-liability."
The Ray court clearly intended the product line exception to be limited
to the circumstances presented in that case, and we decline to extend the
rationale to other circumstances."0
Thus, at least in California, Ray is neither the pro-successor liability
96. Id. at 76.
97. Id. at 74.
98. See supra note 83.
99. Kaminski v. W. MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
100. Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(citation omitted) (quoting CoTCHETT & CARTWRiGHT, CAL. PRODUCT LIABMTY ACTIONS
§ 2.14[5] (rev. ed. 1991)).
101. Id.
102. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
103. Id. at 778.
104. Id. at 781 (citation omitted).
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panacea nor the threat that some alarmists have made it out to be. It remains
good law, but to the extent it lives on, it is largely confined to its particular set
of facts.' °5 Thus, despite the statements to the contrary in Rawlings, 10 6 it
appears that successor liability based on the product line exception will
generally only be imposed on Ray v. Alad Corp. clones or near-clones.
IV. CYR V. B. OFFEN&

Co.: THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S WRONG GUESS

In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,0 7 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
a products liability case involving successor liability under New Hampshire
law.'O8 The district court had imposed successor liability, "ruling that the jury
could find [the successor] liable for whatever torts its predecessor may have
committed."'0 9
The court of appeals emphasized certain facts in affirming the district
court and holding that successor liability was appropriate. Key employees of
the predecessor-a sole proprietorship manufacturing press driers-along
with a single outside financier formed a corporation to buy all of the assets of
the predecessor upon the death of the sole proprietor."0 The asset purchase
agreement obligated the successor to "'(i) cause the Offen Business to be
operated continuously... [and] (ii) cause the Offen Business to be operated
substantially in accordance with the same business practices and policies as
[were] being employed by Offen at the date of the agreement."" 1 '
Furthermore, "[t]he purchase of good will and contract obligations was central
105. In Rosales v. Thermex-Thermatron,Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998),
the court approved imposing successor liability after determining that (1) the sale of assets to
the successor virtually destroyed the plaintiff's remedy against the predecessor because the
purchase price was paid to another entity to which the predecessor owed money and after the
sale the predecessor "had no assets and was not capable of settling its debt to anyone," and "did
not even have a bank account"; (2) the successor had the ability to assume the predecessor's
risk-spreading role because, as in Ray, the successor "obtained the physical plant and
manufacturing equipment of its predecessor," "obtained its predecessor's knowledge of the
business," and "[t]he new corporation's owners were employees of the [predecessor]"; and (3)
it was fair to impose liability on the successor because it continued to benefit from the
predecessor's goodwill, use a name similar to the predecessor and its subsidiaries, and use the
predecessor's customer lists. Id.at 865-66. Compare Rosales, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861, with
Chaknova v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding "that
the circumstances of the [case before it] differ[ed] in significant respect from Ray v. Alad and
[did] not satisfy the three criteria enunciated therein"), and Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co.,
236 Cal. Rptr. 70, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that its case was "factually
distinguishable from Ray, and [did] not satisfy the three criteria which Ray required").
106. Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
107. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
108. Id.at 1150.
109. Id. at 1151.
110. Id.
111. Id.(quoting the asset purchase agreement).
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to the agreement."1' 12 The successor "continued to service and renovate old
dryers."" 3 Additionally, "[n]o notice was given to known customers of B.
Offen Company that a new or different business was beginning.""' 4 The
successor "advertised itself as an ongoing enterprise" and "continued to
produce the same kind of product in essentially the same way."1 15
The court noted that New Hampshire law did not provide any specific
guidance on the issue of successor liability." 6 After addressing the four
traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability for asset
purchasers, the court listed five policy justifications for imposing strict
liability on a manufacturer:
(1)the manufacturer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs while the
consumer is helpless; (2) it is the manufacturer which has launched the
product into the channels of trade; (3) it is the manufacturer which has
violated the representation of safety implicit in putting the product into the
stream of commerce;... (4) the manufacturer is the instrumentality to look
to for improvement of the product's quality[;] ... [and (5)] the more
traditional reason for imposing liability on a corporation for tortuous injuries,
the negligence of its employees." 7
The court then concluded that these policy justifications applied equally to a
corporate successor,"' holding, "Whatever may be the outer limit of liability
on a successor, the district court did not err in refusing to rule as a matter of
law that [the successor] was immune from liability."'119 Cyr, thus, fit squarely
into Professor Phillips' "take the bad with the good" theory of successor
liability.
Only two subsequent First Circuit decisions have addressed the ruling in
Cyr regarding successor liability. In Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co.,12°
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Massachusetts law,' 2 '
explicitly limited Cyr to its facts. 2 The Dayton court recognized that the
"Cyr decision has been viewed as an 'improvisation' on the theme of the
'mere continuation' exception but it has not altered the key in which the
In 1987 the First Circuit, again interpreting
theme is treated."' 23

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1154.
Id.
Id.
739 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1984).
Id.at691.
Id.at 693-94 ("The district court was correct in distinguishing Cyron its facts .
Id.at 693 (citation omitted).
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Massachusetts law, cited Cyr for the general proposition that "where there is
overall continuity in the operation of a business, products liability can be
imposed on a successor corporation which did not exist on the date of
manufacture."'' 24 The Alliedcourt, however, was not confronted with the issue
25
presented in Cyr-imposition of liability on a successor corporation.
Rather, the court was focused on whether the successor had sufficient notice
of claims against its predecessor so that an amended complaint related back
to the date of the initial filing of the complaint. 26 As a result, the Allied
court's reference to Cyr may be considered dicta. The First Circuit has not
otherwise addressed or expanded its holding in Cyr.
Although the Cyr court purported to apply New Hampshire law when
imposing successor liability, subsequent Supreme Court of New Hampshire
decisions have flatly rejected Cyr's imposition of successor liability based on
the risk-spreading policy of strict liability. 127 Consequently, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire has explicitly rejected the "continuity of enterprise"
exception, along with any other extension of successor liability based on riskspreading.12 First limited to its facts by its originating court and then flatly
rejected by the highest court of the state whose law it purported to state, Cyr
can safely be pronounced dead in its home jurisdiction.
V. OTHER STATES' ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF
THE CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE THEORIES
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

Courts in twelve states outside New Hampshire have cited Cyr favorably,
generally adopting either the product line or continuity of enterprise
exceptions to successor liability. 129 Courts in six other states have cited Cyr

124. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 814 F.2d 32, 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1987).
125. Id.at 36.
126. Id.
127. Bielagus v. EMRE of N.H. Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 569 (N.H. 2003) ("[I]n products
liability cases, we consistently have rejected the doctrine of 'risk-spreading' upon which the
'substantial continuity' theory isbased.... We join the majority ofjurisdictions which adhere
to the traditional 'mere continuation' exception to the prohibition against successor liability.");
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 409 (N.H. 1988) (citing Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (N.H. 1978) for the proposition that "to the extent Cyr
does suggest that we embrace risk spreading, it is no longer a valid interpretation of New
Hampshire law").
128. Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 569. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire also has rejected
Cyr's conclusion that the New Hampshire comparative negligence statute applies in strict
liability cases. In Thibault, it held "that the comparative negligence statute does not apply to
strict liability cases because it is confined by its terms to actions for negligence. However, strict
liability is a judicially created doctrine, to which the principle of comparative causation will be
applied as hereinafter described." Thibault, 395 A.2d at 848 (citation omitted).
129. Alabama: Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So. 2d 782, 786-87 (Ala. 1984)
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with ambivalence.130 Nine states, generally those adhering strictly to the
traditional rule of successor nonliability, treat Cyr with disfavor.'31

(noting that the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the continuity of enterprise doctrine in
Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979)).
California:
Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Ray v. Alad Corp.,
560 P.2d 3, 8, 11 (Cal. 1977) (creating the product line exception). Connecticut: A.G. Assocs.
ofNewington Britain v. Parafati, No. CVN0041808NE, 2002 WL 1162890, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 11, 2002) (applying the continuity of enterprise exception). Delaware: Sheppard v.
A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984). Georgia: Farmex, Inc. v.
Wainwright, 501 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. 1998) (implicitly adopting the product line exception).
Kansas: Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1298-99 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Cyr and performingacontinuityofenterprise analysis). Massachusetts: Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver
Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Mass. 1997) (citing Cyr for the proposition that "there
is no requirement that there be complete shareholder identity between the seller and a buyer
before corporate successor liability will attach"). Michigan: Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.,
244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976) (creating the continuity of enterprise exception). New
Jersey: Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 816, 825 (N.J. 1981) (adopting the
product line exception). New Mexico: Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 247-50 (N.M.
1997) (discussing the underlying policies examined in Cyr before adopting the product line
exception). Pennsylvania: Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981) (citing Cyr with approval and adopting the product line exception). Washington:
Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 385-88 (Wash. 1984) (citing Cyr and adopting the
product line exception).
130. Indiana: Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191,1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Cyr for the proposition that express rejection of a predecessor's liability is not dispositive of the
successor liability issue). New York: Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198
(N.Y. 1983) (citing Cyr for the proposition that the predecessor corporation must be
extinguished before liability will be imposed on a successor). North Carolina: Budd Tire
Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Cyr for the
proposition that "inadequate consideration for the purchase, or a lack of some of the elements
of a good faith purchaser for value" is a separate exception to the general rule of successor
nonliability, but not expressly rejecting or adopting this position). South Dakota: Groseth
Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 175 (S.D. 1987) (citing Cyr for the traditional
exceptions). Texas: Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 556 (Tex. 1981)
(citing Cyr for the mere continuation exception without explaining the test). Wisconsin: Tift
v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 322 N.W.2d 14, 19, 27 (Wis. 1982) (including a critique by the
dissent of the Cyr rationale after the majority had imposed liability under the traditional
exceptions).
131. Arizona: Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2003) (deferring to the legislature on successor liability). Colorado: Johnston v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting both the product line and
continuity of enterprise exceptions). Florida: Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049
(Fla. 1982) (refusing to adopt the continuity of enterprise exception). Illinois: Green v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that the
plaintiff's reliance on Cyr was unfounded because continuation in Illinois requires continuity
of stock ownership); State ex rel. Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 29,
33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). Iowa: Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)
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VI. CONCLUSION

The bottom line of the analysis, then, is that we have not come that far
from where we were when Professor Phillips published his article in 1983.
Turner and Ray have been largely confined to their facts in their home
jurisdictions, and Cyr has been rejected by the state whose law it construed.
To the extent that continuity of enterprise or product line continuity theories
of successor liability have been adopted, they have been adopted on the basis
of a risk-spreading policy rather than Professor Phillips' "ongoing business
value" or "take the bad with the good" rationale. But the so-called demise of
continuity of enterprise and product line theories has been overstated by the
pundits and the Restatement. The conflict between tort and corporate law in
this area is far from over. The battle is being waged in state courts, federal
courts, and, notably, the federal bankruptcy courts. It is too soon to tell
whether the continuity doctrines of successor liability will die, survive, or
thrive, and if the latter, whether notions of risk-spreading, ongoing business
value, or some other policy will provide the basis for that outcome.

(citing Cyr and then holding that Iowa is a "traditional" state). Maryland: Nissen Corp. v.
Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 571, 573 (Md. 1991) (expressly rejecting any extension of the traditional
rule). New Hampshire: Bielagus v. EMRE of N.H. Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 569 (N.H. 2003);
Simoneau v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407,409 (N.H. 1988) (stating that, to the extent Cyr
adopted risk-spreading, it was not a valid interpretation of New Hampshire law). North
Dakota: Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (N.D. 1984)
(citing Cyr for the proposition that costs from products liability should be "borne by those best
able to gauge the risks of those costs, protect against them, and pass the costs on to the
consumer," but holding that any extension of the traditional doctrine of successor liability
should be undertaken by the legislature). Ohio: Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617
N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing that Ohio courts do not expand the traditional
exceptions in tort or contract cases). Virginia: Harris v. T.P., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va.
1992) (expressly rejecting the "product line exception" and the "expanded mere continuation
exception").

